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Asked for a term which can subsume a big part of the management and 
governance literature of the last years, “network” would probably be the one to 
choose. Hardly any other approach has spread out so successfully in the discussion. 
And  hardly  any  other  approach  has  produced  such  a  mess  of  different  types, 
concepts and accesses. The relevant literature discloses a real “network-jungle” and 
it would be a hard job to structure the whole debate (Windeler, Wirth 2010; Wetzel 
et al. 2005).  
Although  the  idea  of  a  network  seems  so  simple,  it  is  obviously  very 
difficult to get a real grasp of it. And because of the hype on networks – sometimes 
you get the impression networking is the answer to everything – its difficult to get 
in touch with the basic idea behind it. Roughly, the debate can be divided into three 
different perspectives, which of course are very closely connected to each other: 
One  perspective  deals  with  formal  network  analysis  and  focuses  on  the 
visualisation  of  interrelations,  connections  and  relationships  between  different 
objects. E. g., the whole research on citation networks in science (who cites who) 
or on political and economic influence networks belongs to this type of analysis. 
The second perspective takes an empirical point of view and describes company 
networks as a way of corporate governance. Due to the European Community„s 
initiative, in a lot of European countries Innovation- or Production clusters emerge 
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and turn out as a very effective way for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to 
face the challenges of globalising markets.  
 
1.  Network as a Model of Coordination 
 
In this article, I will start with the third and more theoretical perspective, 
which takes network as a special concept of governance and coordination of actors 
(Powell, 1990; Weyer, 2000): The classical literature divides two different ideal 
models of coordination: market and hierarchy, which have to be introduced in the 
context of this Journal only very shortly and broad brush: As theory states, on 
markets actors meet only at single issues for a short period of time. They exchange 
clearly defined goods for a certain amount of money, so money is the medium of 
coordination. The market – theoretically – exists of an accumulation of single and 
more or less independent actions of more or less independent actors which get 
steered by the famous “invisible hand”. Hierarchy is quite the opposite. It creates 
strong and durable relationships between actors which concern not only single but 
a whole set of actions. Therefore exchanged goods are undefined: in an employer-
employee relationship, there is no need to exactly fix daily business of interchange 
in the work contract. The medium of coordination in hierarchy is power; actions 
get steered by the “visible hand” of the person the other actors depend on. 
Both  models  of  coordination  have  advantages  and  disadvantages.  The 
market is very flexible and reacts very fast to changes. But on the other hand, it is 
highly insecure and risky: the fact that access to resources of other actors is ensured 
at a certain time gives no guarantee that this will be the case another time. Every 
interaction  has  to  be  negotiated.  Hierarchy  in  turn  provides  a  high  degree  of 
security and reliability, the relationship is fixed at one time and guarantees durable 
access to resources of the employee. But on the other hand, it is very inflexible, 
needs the establishment of control structures – in other words bureaucracy – and 
shows a very slow reaction to context changes. 
Beside that, in certain situations neither market nor hierarchy seem to be 
the suitable model of coordination. One example with growing importance is the 
coordination of innovation processes: Innovation processes need a high degree of 
information exchange, in other words they depend on efficient and reliable modes 
of information transfer. But neither markets nor hierarchies provide incentives to 
pass on information between actors: on the markets because information provides 
an  advantage  to  competitors,  in  hierarchy,  because  information  is  a  matter  of 
power. Furthermore innovation processes deal with undefined goods on the one 
side, but have to react to context changes very flexibly and directly on the other 
side. Therefore, management literature has started quite early to look for a third 
mode of coordination which provides the advantages of market and hierarchy and 
avoids the disadvantages (Granovetter 1073). 
Networks seem to be a very effective way of cooperation in theses cases. 
They  establish  reliable  interdependencies  between  independent  partners.  They 
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cultures within a durable coordination of action, and this way offer the possibility 
to  cooperate  without the need  of  powerful structures  of  bureaucracy.  Networks 
normally refer only to certain areas of action – e. g., companies cooperate only in 
certain  aspects,  but  stay  competitive  in  others.  They  bring  market  egoists  into 
durable  relationships  and  undermine  hierarchical  structures  by  combining  them 
with  competitive  elements.  Therefore  networks  always  imply  inherent  tensions 
between  cooperation  and  competition  on  the  one  side,  between  autonomy  and 
dependency on the other. These inherent tensions make it necessary to look for a 
medium of coordination which is as strong and efficient as “money” and “power”, 
but avoids their insecurity and inflexibility.  
 
2.  Trust as the base of Networks  
 
The sociological perspective might help here: From a sociological point of 
view, the success of “money” and “power” as a medium of coordination lies in 
their ability to reduce complexity in an overcomplex world. To take it as an picture: 
While  the  „homo  economicus“  has  theoretically  acted  in  a  situation  of  full 
information  the  „homo  sociologicus“  tries  to  behave  „meaningful“  with  his 
restricted resources in an intransparent, confusing and overwhelming world. Facing 
an open and risky future, he is always interested in finding possibilities to reduce 
complexity and to influence future in a - for him - favourable way
1. Money as a 
generalised medium gives him the possibility, to realise his decisions in the future 
and power makes it possible for him to influence the future behaviour of other 
people. But in both cases he makes an underlying assumption, which is not part of 
the medium itself but the premise for its function: the assumption, that - in future - 
money will still be valuable and power will still be in place. In other words, he 
trusts in the future of these mediums. This leads to a third and not less strong 
medium for the reduction of complexity: trust. 
To make things a bit less theoretical: It is easy to understand how trust 
helps to reduce complexity when you think about the absence of trust: Distrust ties 
a lot of attention and makes it necessary to spend much ti me on the collection of 
information and the establishment of structures of control. To make the decision to 
cooperate with somebody or not, is a long, complex and expensive process, which 
can be extremely abbreviated by coming back to existing trust relati onships. This 
way, cooperation can be established much faster than on bargaining or on power. 
Trust reduces the time I need to collect information and to establish control 
structures.  
Furthermore,  trust  makes  it  possible  to  transfer  the  expectation  of  a 
payback for investment into the future. In other words: If I trust somebody, I am 
willing to invest into the relationship without expecting a reward immediately. 
Finally, trust makes it easier to deal with conflicts since actors are more 
willing to see conf licts as a sign of misunderstanding than of aggression. They 
                                                 
1 This perspective is mainly followed by the systemtheory of Niklas Luhmann and others (Luhmann, 
2000) See also (Bachmann, 2000) Review of International Comparative Management              Volume 11, Issue 4, October  2010  649   
would prefer “voice”, which means to actively address problems, instead of “exit”, 
to quit the relationship altogether. 
In  fact,  most  of  the  network  literature  states  that  trust  is  the  base  of 
networks, the medium on which networks rely as a third model of coordination 
beyond  markets  and  hierarchies. And  also  in  the  reflection  on  the  practices  of 
existing networks, it‟s very often said, that trust is the most important key for the 
success of networks (Dammler, 2007). But most of this literature stays with this 
statement without going into a deeper understanding of the mechanism of trust, its 
conditions and the detailed role, different types of trust play in the establishment 
and stabilisation of network relationships.    
 
Definition of Trust  
 
What does it mean to trust somebody? Different theories have dealt with 
this question but altogether they come all to more or less the same core: to trust 
some body means to let the own behaviour be guided by the assumption, that the 
other will behave in a favourable way  – knowing that he doesn„t have to. If I lend 
my money to a friend on a trust basis, I behave under the assumption, that he will 
give it back to me in future - knowing that he also can betray me.  
This leads to the interesting question, why people behave in such a way? 
What is the precondition for trusting somebody? Well, maybe because one has 
made  good  experiences  with  this  person  in  the  past  or  with  others  in  similar 
situations.  In  this  case  experiences  in  the  past  are  taken  as  the  basis  for  the 
estimation of future behaviour. This kind of trust is very well known in our daily 
life: A salesman who made the experience that a customer always paid his dues in 
the past, will be prepared to give him credit because he estimates the risk of not 
getting the money back on the experiences he made with this customer previously. 
 
Different Types of Trust 
 
This example however refers to a very special kind of trust. There are 
many reasons to trust and the basis of trust can be very different. Our salesman 
makes a kind of calculation: By trusting the customer, he is able to realise gains by 
selling something. So he is better off by trusting him than in the case that he would 
not do so, but of course only if the customer doesn‟t misuse the trust. If that were 
the case, the salesman would be worse off than without trusting the customer. This 
simple fact has led to many attempts to come to a kind of formula, which could 
give an idea in which situations people would trust and in which they wouldn‟t. 
Indeed, there is some kind of calculative trust, which makes it more likely that 
people trust in situations where the damage in cases trust gets betrayed is little, the 
gain in case the trust is verified is big (Coleman, 1990). In new situations, people 
very often start with this kind of trust, just to get some experiences. Trust is built up 
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But  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  many  situations  where  people  don‟t 
calculate  and  are  better  off  not  doing  so. The  engagement  of  a  babysitter,  for 
example: the gain of having a nice evening out is very small compared with the 
damage  of  a  possible  betrayal.  In  such  cases,  no  calculation  would  lead  to  a 
positive result. Nevertheless, many parents go out. So trust must find here another 
basis: cultural norms. People have learned to trust other people, especially these 
who  belong  to  the  same  group  as  they  do:  cultural,  ethnical  or  social. Actors 
estimate the behaviour of others not by the experiences they made with this person 
but on the basis of the belief that he or she sticks to the same rules and values as 
one self does. This norm-based trust is more likely within homogeneous groups, it 
is more difficult to establish in very heterogeneous contexts, for example between 
members of different cultures (Lane, 1989) 
Beside that, people very often just trust because it is much easier to do so. 
That‟s  true  in  many  situations  in  everyday  life:  Without  some  amount  of 
generalised trust (Luhmann, 2000), life would be very exhausting and complex. 
People would always have to hide if they met a foreigner in the street; every single 
act of purchase – even in the bakery at the corner – would take a lot of time, since 
both sides had to ensure themselves not to get tricked. As stated earlier, dealing 
with  a  very  complex  and  intransparent  world,  trust  is  a  good  way  to  reduce 
complexity.  In  every  day  life  we  routinely  trust  without  any  calculation  or 
estimation of the “normality” of the others, we just trust because it makes our life 
liveable.  
Lucky enough, the risk and danger, which goes with this generalised trust 
can be safeguarded by another basis of trust: sometimes we may not trust in the 
person, but we trust in institutions which could support us in cases the trust gets 
betrayed: an effective legal system, a guarantee by an independent organisation, a 
label which ensures certain controls, etc. This institution based trust is trusting in 
the possibility of sanctions in the case of betrayal. As soon as sanctions have been 
executed, the relationship of course is no trust relationship anymore.  
Calculative, norm-based, generalized and institution-based trust are four 
different kinds of trust which get established by different kinds of trust-building 
processes: by making direct experiences with the other persons, by defining and 
establishing shared values, by reducing complexity or by trusting in third parties 
like institutions.  
 
3.  Trust in Network Relationships 
 
That  is  especially  important  when  looking  on  the  establishment  of 
networks, since these different types of trust play different roles in different phases 
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There are two main problems in networks where trust is involved in a very 
special way: in establishing and in stabilising network relationships
1:   
Building up a network as such is a wicked problem which, put in a 
nutshell, consists in the need of somebody having to make the first step. One of the 
future network partners needs to make an investment without a guarantee of any 
reward. E. g., if a company approaches other companies to build up cooperation on 
a shared problem, the first step is to actually make the confession being affected by 
this problem which can result into a disadvantage. It has to lower its defences and 
take the risk of giving potential competitors useful information. In this phase actors 
very often come back to calculative trust: they look for information about the 
partners – maybe in terms of reputation – and approach each other step by step. 
Especially if stakes are high, norm-based trust would be ineffective and naïve here. 
Sometimes there is the possibility of institution-based trust, if for example a third 
party in which all partners trust brings the partners together. Nevertheless, at some 
stage they have to decide to trust, which always is a leap into the dark. 
Therefore, during the establishment of trust relationships every operation is 
given additional importance. It is the time of “symbolic control”: every action of a 
partner is not only taken as information about the partner‟s behaviour in the very 
situation  but  as  a  symbol  for  his  interests,  motives  and  his  cooperativeness 
altogether. Since partners don‟t know much about each other, they start to collect 
information  by  direct  interaction.  Every  disappointment  –  even  if  it  is  only 
concerning  a  small  detail  –  can  lead  to  breakdown  of  cooperation.  The 
development of trust in this phase can be very fragile. Normally, partners act very 
cautious, they accompany each operation with detailed explanations to avoid any 
misunderstandings, and a lot of energy is spent in symbolic actions by which they 
assure their cooperativeness. It is important to invest time and resources in these 
symbolic actions since they can be crucial for the establishment of networks. At the 
same time, the partners should not be overstrained with too high investments. They 
need the possibility to make direct experiences in interaction with low stakes to 
learn trusting each other step by step. 
Not only the establishment of a network is a trust-related task, but also its 
stabilisation.  The  biggest  danger  for  existing  networks  is  any  opportunistic 
behaviour of one or more network partners. There are different forms of abuse of 
networks
: 
The so called Dazzlers are partners, who pretend to cooperate but actually 
don‟t.  Maybe  they  feed  in  wrong  information,  make  promises  which  they 
“unfortunately” couldn‟t realise; console the other partners from one meeting to the 
next and in the meantime look for their own advantage. They try to actually gain 
from the network‟s outcome without any investment.  
Free riders do the same by joining the network at a later stage when all 
investments  have  been  made  and  the  rewards  are  ready  to  get  distributed. 
                                                 
1  See  Holwaldt,  HJ.  /  Ellerkmann,  F  (2007):  Entwicklungsphasen  von  Netzwerken  und 
Unternehmenskooperationen.  In:  In:  Becker,  T.  et  al.  (Ed.):  Netzwerkmanagement.  Mit 
Kooperation zum Unternehmenserfolg. Berlin / Heidelberg /New York.     Volume 11, Issue 4, October  2010            Review of International Comparative Management  652 
Innovations can be taken over, reputation of the network used for their own benefit, 
knowledge gathered in the network applied. This way, the partner avoids sharing 
the risks of the establishment of a network but nevertheless gets his piece of the pie 
in case of success. 
Finally the robbers take the pie in full. These partners join the network, 
invest their part and at some stage leave the network taking the profits with them. 
Especially in innovation networks, partners for example can patent an idea and so 
exclude others from using it. Or they could use information gathered within the 
network to compete against the others. 
It  is  nearly  impossible  to  completely  preclude  this  kind  of  destructive 
behaviour.  Nevertheless,  there  are  ways  of  developing  institutions  within  the 
network the partners can rely on: specific rules get concerted, possible sanctions 
defined, an arbitration board installed. Again, as soon as sanctions get executed, the 
trusting relationship to the partner involved has come to an end. But at the same 
time, the trust into the institution can be strengthened, so that the network as such 
could work even better than before. Apart from these worst case scenarios, in the 
course  of  the  daily  business  of  the  network,  norm-based  trust  will  grow  and 
gradually  substitute  the  calculative  trust.  The  more  the  partners  have  made 
experiences  of  interaction  the  more  they  can  come  back  to  information  they 
collected about each other. At the same time, the amount of interaction makes it 
very costly to always calculate, so there are good reasons to actually rely on the 
experiences  of  practically  shared  values.  Trust  becomes  a  broader  basis;  the 
relationships are not so fragile anymore. 
At the same time, a new problem can arise: Very often the members of a 
network are also members of a business organisation and therefore act within two 
different frames. They develop loyalty to the network as well as to their business 
organisation, which may not necessarily have the same interests. Network members 
have to account for decisions taken in the network to their business organisations. 
Normally they are willing to learn from the experiences within the network and 
therefore  are  prepared  to  support  required  adjustments,  e.  g.  an  increase  of 
investments. On the other hand, their business organisation is interested in keeping 
investments down as much as possible, so they would react more conservatively to 
these adjustments. If the gap between the dynamics within the network and the 
business organisation‟s interest in stability gets to wide, the network might get in 
trouble.  Therefore  it  is  important  to  involve  more  representatives  of  one 
organisation within a network. 
 
4.  Trust-Supporting Structures 
 
This  already  leads  to  the  interesting  question  of  which  organisational 
structures are supportive for the development of trust (Sydow 1998). One very 
important aspect is the frequency and openness of communication. Trust will be 
constituted  much  easier,  if  network  partners  communicate  very  often  and  very 
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experiences. This way it is easier to anticipate the behaviour of others, to develop a 
common understanding and shared interests. Therefore in networks important to 
create possibilities for the network members to communicate in many different 
situations. 
At the same time, trust is easier to obtain when relations are multiple and 
cover not only single aspects but very different areas of action. The experiences 
partners make are more holistic if interactions are multiple, and so it is easier to 
assess the motives and interest of a partner. Furthermore, the price to be paid for a 
betrayal of trust is rising with the multiplicity of relationships. 
Trust is also supported by relationships which are long-term orientated and 
– at least in principle – don‟t have a fixed date of termination. The “shadow of the 
future”  promises  the  possibility  of  many  fruitful  exchanges  and  increases  the 
expected rewards of cooperation. 
Another very important aspect is a balanced proportion of autonomy and 
commitment. There is no objective measure for the right balance but it is essential 
that the members of a network themselves have the impression and feeling of an 
balanced proportion, so they more or less feel an equilibrium between their own 
interests and the interests of the network. 
But also the selection of participants is crucial: Trust is much more likely 
in small networks, where members have the possibility to interact very frequently 
and get to know each other, so the number of participants should not be too big. As 
discussed  in  the  context  of  norm-based  trust,  it  is  easier  to  establish  trust 
relationships between members of the same cultural and social group, so the more 
similarity of the partners exists, the more easily they would start to trust with each 
other.  
And  finally,  the  context  of  the  network  plays  an  important  role.  If  the 
partners are part of a small community with a high rate of information exchange, 
the price for betrayal of trust is much higher than if they met in an anonymous and 
incoherent context. At the same time, if partners don‟t have many possibilities to 
act outside the network, their interest to keep the network going will grow. 
All these factors promote trust and thereby facilitate the possibility to build 
networks as an efficient and in many cases advisable way of coordination. 
 
Problematic Aspects of Trust 
 
Nevertheless, there are also some problems connected with trust which make it 
questionable if it is always the right answer to questions of coordination (Ellrich et al., 
2002).  Fist,  building  up  trust  is  a  time-consuming  and  costly  process,  a  lot  of 
investment  has  to  be  made,  a  lot  of  interaction  without  clear  results  have  to  be 
conducted.  There  might  be  good  reasons  for  not  going  that  path  but  to  rely  on 
bargaining, where disappointment can be avoided since everybody is clearly motivated 
by its own interest, or on power, where the own interests can be executed very directly 
and even against resistance. That‟s especially true since the establishment of trust is so 
complex and the result is so fragile. Trust is a very unstable and precarious condition:    Volume 11, Issue 4, October  2010            Review of International Comparative Management  654 
the mechanism of symbolic control, as described earlier – every action is taken as an 
information  about  the  partner  all  together  –  makes  it  possible,  that  one  single 
disappointment  in  a  special  situation  can  irretrievable  destroy  the  complete  trust 
relationship and foil all investments. 
But there are other problems which might lead to sub-optimal results in trust 
relationships: Deep trust between partners and the high reputation generated in such 
situations  makes  it  easy  to  just  take  over  information  from  each  other  without 
controlling  it  again  and  without  adjusting  it  to  one‟s  own  situation.  Thereby, 
phenomena like “group think” get generated: a dominant conviction within a group 
develops its own dynamics and members believe in it, even if it is not true just to keep 
the cohesion of the group high. This way false information can persist for a long time. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of the network process could trick the partners into 
always looking for solutions within the network without checking alternatives outside 
the group. So they miss innovative and better ideas and stay within the same frame of 
thinking. In this case, the innovative capacity of networks and its weak ties to connect 
very  heterogeneous  actors  and  much  differentiated  ideas  gets  undermined  by  the 
temptation to generate a group identity by excluding others
1. 
These problematic aspects of trust make it feasible, to actually combine trust 
with a healthy amount of cultivated distrust. Members should not just rely on the 
network but also stay awake and attentive. Such deep trust / deep distrust settings help 
to avoid the negative results of a distrust culture on the one side, the destructive effects 
of mafia-like sleaze on the other side by equally promoting cooperativeness and high 
attention. 
Calculative trust seems to be the suitable answer here: It emphasises the risk 
aspect of trust relationships and thereby keeps expectations realistic. At the same time, 
disappointment is not a moral question anymore which stigmatises one par tner as a bad 
player  but  a  question  of  to  high  expectations  and  misleading  communication. 
Furthermore, the fact that members also orientate themselves outside of the network 
doesn‟t make them a traitor anymore but is accepted as legitimate way of keeping self-
interests viable. Trust and networks are  very effective and convincing concepts  of 
coordination,  since  they  make  many  things  much  easier,  trickle  innovation  and 
normally are characterised by high degree of motivation. But they should be handled 
with care and attention, since used in a naïve and misleading way, they can also destroy 
a lot of social capital and relationships. That is especially true in situations where 
underlying power relations get covered by the network label. There is tendency today 
to actually use “network” as a more friendly description of the old and still effective 
hierarchical structures. Doing so, a very innovative concept gets undermined by a 
dishonest and obscure way of application. The results are even more destructive since it 
is more or less impossible to restore trust which once has been frustrated or betrayed. 
This way, the future coordination might be much more ineffective than within a 
clear and obvious hierarchical setting. 
                                                 
1 To avoid this effect, some authors recommend to member of different networks, so to say to build 
up a super-network of networks (Burt, 1992). This will help to same stage but of course sooner or 
later create the same problem on a higher level.  Review of International Comparative Management              Volume 11, Issue 4, October  2010  655   
Refereneces 
 
1.  Bachmann, R., 2000. „Die Kooperation und Steuerung interorganisationaler 
Netzwerkbeziehungen über Vertrauen und Macht“. In: Sydow J./ Windeler, A. 
(Ed.):  Steuerung  von  Netzwerken:  Konzepte  und  Praktiken,  Opladen,  
pp. 107-125. 
2.  Burt,  R.,  1992.  Structural  holes:  The  social  structure  of  competition. 
Cambridge.  
3.  Coleman, J.S., 1990. Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge Mass. 
4.  Dammer, I., 2007. „Gelingende Kooperation („Effizienz“)“. In: Becker, T. et 
al. (Ed.): Netzwerkmanagement. Mit Kooperation zum Unternehmenserfolg. 
Berlin / Heidelberg /New York, pp. 37-47 
5.  Ellrich,  L.,  Funken,  C.  &  Meister,  M.,  2002.  „Kultiviertes  Misstrauen. 
Bausteine  zu  einer  Soziologie  strategischer  Netzwerke“.  In:  Sociologica 
Internationalis 40, pp. 23 - 66 
6.  Granovetter, M., 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties. In: Marsden”, P. V./ Lin, 
N (Ed.): Social Structure of Weak Ties, California, pp. 105 - 130. 
7.  Holwaldt, H.J., Ellerkmann, F., 2007. „Entwicklungsphasen von Netzwerken 
und  Unternehmenskooperationen“.  In:  Becker,  T.  et  al.  (Ed.): 
Netzwerkmanagement.  Mit  Kooperation  zum  Unternehmenserfolg.  Berlin  / 
Heidelberg /New York, pp. 35-48. 
8.  Lane, C., 1989. “Theories and Issues in the Study of Trust”. In: Lane C./ 
Bachmann, R.: Trust Within and Between Organizations. Conceptual Issues 
and Empirical Applications. Oxford, pp. 1-30. 
9.  Luhmann,  N.,  2000.  Vertrauen.  Ein  Mechanismus  der  Reduktion  sozialer 
Komplexität. Stuttgart. 
10.  Powell,  W.,  1990.  “Neither  Market  nor  Hierarchy.  Network  Forms  of 
Organization”. In: Research in Organizational Behaviour 12, pp. 195–336. 
11.  Sydow, J., 1998. “Understanding the Constitution of Interorganizational Trust”. 
In:  Lane,  C./  Bachman,  R  (Hg.):  Trust  within  and  between  organizations: 
Conceptual issues and empirical applications, Oxford, pp. 31 - 63 
12.  Weyer,  J.,  2000.  „Zum  Stand  der  Netzwerkforschung  in  den 
Sozialwissenschaften“. In: Weyer, J. (Ed.): Soziale Netzwerke. Konzepte und 
Methoden  der  sozialwissenschaftlichen  Netzwerkforschung,  München,  
pp. 134. 
13.  Wetzel, R., Aderhold, J & Meyer, M., 2005.  „Systematisierender Auftakt“. In: 
Aderhold,  J.,  Meyer,  M.  &  Wetzel,  R.  Modernes  Netzwerkmanagement. 
Wiesbaden, pp. 3-12.  
14.  Windeler, A., Wirth, C., 2010. „Netzwerke und Arbeit“. In: Böhle, F., Voß, G. 
& Wachtler, G. Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie. Wiesbaden; pp. 569-596 